More granular details can be found in the RFC although there are significant changes to the structure of the proposal and options to be voted on
Wonderland should earn a yield on part of its BTC and ETH position. It can do this by diverting BTC and ETH to mint GLP, a token paying 15-20% yield on the GMX platform.
Based on feedback, the ideal position size for GLP would be $12.5m in value, to keep our risk diversified.
As GLP is about 55:45 BTC/ETH:Stablecoins, minting GLP by using only BTC and ETH would reduce exposure to BTC and ETH (e.g., exchanging $1 in BTC for $0.50 BTC and $0.50 in Stablecoins reduces exposure to BTC by half). Minting GLP using a mix of stablecoins and crypto would allow Wonderland to maintain the same exposure to BTC and ETH as it currently has.
This WIP will allow voters to choose which road we should go down. The options will be:
YES (A) - Invest in GLP and keep exposure to BTC and ETH unchanged
YES (B) - Invest in GLP and lower exposure to BTC and ETH
NO - Do not invest in GLP
- The core objective is to utilize our treasury assets more productively and earn a yield to increase treasury size or enable a higher revenue-share.
- This proposal may also help Yieldchad execute on his potential future strategies, and improves liquidity for our BTC and ETH which are instantly liquid on GMX.
GMX is a trading platform on Arbitrum and Avalanche, and GLP is a liquidity token on this platform. GLP can be seen as akin to a basket of BTC, ETH and USD and GLP can be minted or sold freely for its constituent assets. GLP holders are paid various fees for providing liquidity to GMX traders.
If YES (A) or YES (B) win the vote, Wonderland will mint GLP and earn a yield while maintaining exposure to BTC and ETH – whether that exposure is identical to the current exposure, or lower, depends on which of the two YES options wins out.
For lower-level details on GLP, read the RFC
The first risk is smart contract risk.
The smart contracts on GMX have been audited and currently contain a TVL greater than $USD 200m across Avalanche and Arbitrum. They have not been exploited in the past despite the > 350 million dollar incentive that exists to do so (if you can exploit GLP and steal the underlying assets, you would gain close to 350m in BTC ETH USDC and other assets). Further, given the popularity of GMX as a platform, several commentators have examined GMX’s smart contracts and have generally not found exploits. One such piece of mature commentary and the corresponding response by GMX’s main dev can be found here.
The second risk is that $GLP act as “the house” where holders win when traders lose, and vice versa.
Leveraged traders have consistently been unprofitable on the GMX platform. However, there is a foreseeable risk that in a grey swan event, traders win en-masse and $GLP holders experience depreciation of $GLP. This risk is slightly mitigated in a bull-market where traders win on longs as the BTC, ETH and AVAX component of $GLP would also appreciate and slightly offset trader-winnings. This risk is exacerbated in bear-markets where traders win on shorts as $GLP loses value both from traders winning and from the depreciation of BTC, AVAX and ETH.
Over the past year of trading on GMX, traders have been consistently unprofitable. This pattern is not unique to GMX, it is relatively well-known that as an aggregate, traders tend to be unprofitable and this can be observed on other platforms such as Gains Network as well. In order to hedge against this risk, Yieldchad will likely issue further strategies and it is also possible to decrease exposure to GLP when short open-interest on GMX is unusually high. It is also within the remit of the treasury council or other parts of the treasury team to further reduce exposure to BTC and ETH at any point, thereby providing some means to potentially address this risk. Note, these are not the only two risks to GLP, but they are two that were selected as among the most prominent and clear risks.
Details of the Snapshot Vote:
- The outcome of this vote will not be decided based on which option attains a simple majority.
- Instead, note whether the sum of votes for the YES options exceeds the sum of votes for the NO option. If so, Wonderland will mint GLP.
- From there, consider which YES option was more popular and abide by that option.
- To illustrate, if the vote is split 32-28-40 between YES (A), YES (B) and NO, it is YES (A) that wins the vote by the process above.
The options will be:
- YES (A) - Invest in GLP and keep exposure to BTC and ETH unchanged
- YES (B) - Invest in GLP and lower exposure to BTC and ETH
- NO - Do not invest in GLP
Snapshot link: https://wl-l.ink/Snapshot/WIP-19
Details of Executing the Proposal
- The ideal position size for GLP indicated by Yieldchad and echoed by other community members is 12.5m USD
- If YES (A) wins the vote, the treasury will deploy a mix of BTC, ETH and stablecoins to minting GLP such that the overall % of treasury exposed to BTC and ETH remains the same.
- In this case, assume that GLP is composed of 55% BTC/ETH and 45% stablecoins. YES (A) being executed would require $6.875m in BTC/ETH and $5.625m in stablecoins to be deployed to GMX to mint GLP.
- If YES (B) wins the vote, the treasury will deploy $12.5m in value of BTC/ETH to GMX to mint GLP.
- GLP should be minted across both GMX-Avalanche and GMX-Arbitrum in even amounts per Yieldchad’s comment on the RFC on the diversification of risk.
- It is likely that the cheapest and safest method of bridging funds to Arbitrum and Avalanche will either involve Multichain, Synapse or a transfer using a CEX or OTC partner as an intermediary. On-chain methods of bridging are preferable given that there is currently no treasury manager.